¡Descarga es: correlación, postulación, verificación. La lógica del proceso de investigación: el Mét y más Tesinas en PDF de Biomedicina solo en Docsity!
--
NEOLIBERALISM, NEOREALISM, AND
WORLD POLITICS
David A. Baldwin
In 1986 Robert 0. Keohane edited a volume entitled Neorealism
and Its Critics, which focused on the reformulation of traditional
realist thinking about international politics by Kenneth Waltz (1979)
and reactions from a variety of scholars. Waltz had recast the tenets
of classical realism in order to delineate more clearly the effects of the
structure of the international system on the behavior of nation-states.
In addition, Waltz viewed his work as different from that of earlier
realists in its treatment of power and of states as units of the system
(Waltz 1979; 1990). The critics, according to Keohane (1986a:24), sought
to move beyond the nation-state by "devising new international
institutions or regimes," by reinterpreting the principles of sover-
eignty, or by challenging the "validity of the 'state as actor' model on
which neorealism relies." Whereas some critics called for more atten-
tion to economic and environmental interdependence as well as
changes in governmental functions, information, and international
regimes, others attacked the epistemology on which Waltz based his
argument.
In a sense, this volume picks up where Neorealism and Its Critics
ended. Unlike that volume, however, the contributors to this one
share many fundamental assumptions about the nature and purpose
of social scientific inquiry. This allows them to engage one another's
arguments directly and results in a more focused and productive
debate.
4 David A. Baldwin
In recent years the most powerful challenge to neorealism, some-
times labeled structural realism, has been mounted by neoliberal insti-
tutionalists. The term distinguishes these scholars from earlier vari- eties of liberalism, such as commercial liberalism, republican liberal- ism, and sociological liberalism (Nye 1988; Grieco 1988a:488n; Keohane
1990a). Commercial liberalism refers to theories linking free trade and
peace; republican liberalism refers to theories linking democracy with
peace; and sociological liberalism refers to theories linking transnational
interactions with international integration. The immediate intellec- tual precursors of liberal institutionalism are theories of international regimes (Krasner l983a).
NEOLlBERALlSM AND NEOREALISM: TERMS OF THE
CONTEMPORARY DEBATE
Six focal points, described below, characterize the current de- bate between neoliberalism and neorealism.
The Nature and Consequences of Anarchy
Although no one denies that the international system is anarch- ical in some sense, there is disagreement as to what this means and why it matters. Arthur Stein (1982a:324) distinguishes between the "independent decision making" that characterizes anarchy and the "joint decision making" in international regimes and then suggests that it is the self interests of autonomous states in a state of anarchy that leads them to create international regimes. Charles Lipson (198422) notes that the idea of anarchy is the "Rosetta stone of international relations" but suggests that its importance has been exaggerated by the neorealists at the expense of recognizing the importance of inter- national interdependence. Robert Axelrod and Robert 0. Keohane (1985) emphasize the importance of anarchy defined as the absence of government but argue that this constant feature of world politics
permits a variety of patterns of interaction among states. Joseph M.
Grieco (1988a:497-98) contends that neoliberals and neorealists fun- damentally diverge with respect to the nature and consequences of anarchy. He asserts that the neoliberal institutionalists underestimate the importance of worries about survival as motivations for state behavior, which he sees as a necessary consequence of anarchy.
6 David A. Baldwin
absolute gains for both parties does not elicit their cooperation so long as each fears how the other will use its increased capabilities (Waltz 1979:105). Stein (1982a:318) depicts the liberal view of self interest as one in which actors with common interests try to maximize their absolute gains. Actors trying to maximize relative gains, he asserts, have no common interests. Lipson (1984:15-18) suggests that relative gains considerations are likely to be more important in security matters than in economic affairs. Grieco (1988a:487) contends that neoliberal institutionalism has been preoccupied with actual or potential abso- lute gains from international cooperation and has overlooked the importance of relative gains. He suggests that "the fundamental goal of states in any relationship is to prevent others from achieving advances in their relative capabilities" (Grieco 1988a:498; italics in original). Snidal (1991b) disputes the neorealist contention that concerns about rela- tive gains inhibit cooperation except in the special case of bipolar relationships between states preoccupied with relative gains. He also suggests that the distinction between relative and absolute gains is not so clear-cut as it might seem. The relative gains problem can be stated in terms of trade-offs between long- and short-term absolute gains. Powell (1991b) uses deductive models to argue that concerns about relative gains will inhibit cooperation when the utility of mili- tary force is high but not when the utility of force is 1ow.l Mastan- dun0 (1991) uses empirical case studies to address the questions of whether and how relative gains matter. His conclusions provide some support for both sides of the debate. While he finds concerns about relative gains present in the policy-making process in all of his three cases, such concerns were not reflected in the policy outcomes for all the cases. In his essay for this volume Keohane acknowledges that neoliberal institutionalists have underestimated the importance of relative gains in world politics under certain conditions. The im- portant thing, according to Keohane, is to specify those conditions. He notes that this may be difficult since the behavior of states pursu- ing relative gains may be very similar to the behavior of states pur- suing absolute gains.
Neoliberalism, Neorealism, and World Politics^7
Priority of State Goals Neoliberals and neorealists agree that both national security and economic welfare are important, but they differ in relative em- hasis on these goals. Lipson (1984) argues that international coop- ration is more likely in economic issue areas than in those concern- g military security. Since neorealists tend to study security issues nd neoliberals tend to study political economy, their differing esti- ates of the ease of cooperation may be related to the issues they dy. Grieco (1988a) contends that anarchy requires states to be cupied with relative power, security, and survival. Powell (1991b) ructs a model intended to bridge the gap between neoliberal phasis on economic welfare and neorealist emphasis of security. his model, states are assumed to be trying to maximize their economic welfare in a world where military force is a possibility. For the most part, neorealists or neoliberals treat state goals by assump- tion. As Keohane (this volume) points out, neither approach is good predicting interests.
Intentions Versus Capabilities The classical realist Hans J. Morgenthau depicted concern about e motives of statesmen as a fallacious way to understand foreign licy. Instead he advocated assuming that statesmen "think and act terms of interest defined as power" (1967:5-6), which, he believed, ould enable analysts to understand the actions and thoughts of atesmen better than they themselves do. Although contemporary orealists are unlikely to take such an extreme position, they are ely to emphasize capabilities more than intentions. Grieco (1988a:498,
- points out that uncertainties about the future intentions and nterests of other states lead statesmen to pay close attention to capabilities, "the ultimate basis for their security and independence." In a similar vein, Krasner (1991) criticizes the neoliberals for overem- phasizing intentions, interests, and information and underemphas- izing the distribution of capabilities. Keohane (this volume) argues that the sensitivity of states to the relative gains of other states is significantly influenced by perceptions of the intentions of such states. Thus states worry more about relative gains of enemies than of allies. Stein (1982a) explains international regimes in terms of the pattern of
Neoliberalisrn, Neorealism, and World Politics^9
references to this issue by some of the authors (e.g., Grieco 1988a:491n; lner 1991:76, 78; Krasner 1991:342), only Robert Powell (1991b) otes much attention to the question of the utility of military &niques of statecraft. It is not clear why this issue receives so little attention since it does not seem to have been resolved. One should not be surprised if it resurfaces as the debate evolves. Second, earlier critics of realism, especially in the 1930s, 1940s, d 1950s, often cast the debate as one between altruistic moralists egoistic power calculators. In the current debate, however, both s argue from assumptions that states behave like egoistic value izers. Moral considerations are hardly mentioned. Third, the n of whether to treat states as the essential actors in interna- 1 politics has been pushed into the background. Although neo- sts and neoliberals disagree on the relative importance of non- te actors, both treat states as the primary actors. And fourth, this t a debate between conflict theorists and cooperation theorists. twin ideas that conflict and cooperation are intrinsic elements of national politics and that both can be studied at the same time ccepted by both sides. The books by neorealist Joseph M. Grieco ) and neoliberal Robert 0. Keohane (1984) are contributions to ries of conflict and cooperation. Although neorealists are more y to emphasize conflict and neoliberals are more likely to empha- cooperation, both sides have moved beyond the simple dichot- between cooperation and conflict that characterized earlier dis-
The quality of scholarly debate in this volume is extraordinarily
. That is to say, the authors genuinely try to understand and ess one another's arguments. The overall tone of the essays in volume signals a desire to advance knowledge rather than to e debating points in defense of entrenched positions. re is, however, one unsatisfactory aspect of the debate. This called the terminological dimension. Loaded terms and tic sleight of hand are anathema to scholarly debate. In this e each school of thought carries an unfortunate label. Research programs, as Stephen Krasner (1991) points out, have connotations as well as denotations. And the connotation of "realism" (or "neo- realism") is one of looking at the world as it really is. This was not only the connotation but the denotation as well for two of the intel- lectual forefathers of neorealism. For E. H. Carr, realism focused on
10 David A. Baldwin
"what was and what is" in contrast to utopianism, which focused on
what could and should be (Carr 1946:ll). For Hans J. Morgenthau,
realism earned its name by concentrating on "human nature as it actually is" and on "historic processes as they actually take place"
(Morgenthau 1967:4). Inis L. Claude's characterization of the usage
of the phrase "balance of power" by an earlier generation of realists reminds us that scholarly debate can be impaired by loaded terminol- ogy:
[There is a] widespread tendency to make balance of power a symbol of realism, and hence of responsibility, for the scholar or statesman. In this usage, it has no substantive meaning as a concept. It is a test of intellectual virility, of he-manliness in the field of international rela- tions. The man who "accepts" the balance of power, who dots his writing with approving references to it, thereby asserts his claim to being a hard-headed realist, who can look at the grim reality of power without flinching. The man who rejects the balance of power convicts himself of softness, of cowardly incapacity to look power in the eye and acknowledge its role in the affairs of states. (Claude 1962:39).
It is unfortunate that the current debate still uses the misleading
terms realism and neorealism. The debate in this volume is not be-
tween those who study the world as it is and those who study the world as it should be; it is between two groups of scholars with reasonable disagreements as to how to describe and interpret the real world.
The term liberalism is objectionable less because of value loading
than because it is likely to confuse and mislead. Neither realism nor liberalism has traditionally been considered the opposite of the other. The usual opposite of liberalism is conservatism. The term liberalism has figured more prominently in discussions of domestic politics than in discussions of international politics. Except for the relatively recent debate with respect to the propensity of liberal democracies to make war, the term liberalism has been largely confined to the dis- cussion of economic aspects of international relation^.^
Despite such objections, the terms neorealism (or structural realism)
and neoliberalism (or neoliberal institutionalism) are so deeply embed-
ded in the literature that little can be done. Perhaps as the debate progresses, we can develop more satisfactory labels for various schools of thought. Keohane (this volume) is also uncomfortable with the
12 David A. Baldwin
the end of the eighteenth century. They attacked almost all the ideas embraced by realists. They espoused the idea of a world civilization and world citizenship, promoted the idea of the primacy of domestic affairs over foreign affairs, denounced military alliances, and dis- puted the idea that the balance of power could ensure peace. They emphasized the mutual interests of states and advocated free trade, which they argued would help prevent war (Russell 1936; Gilbert 1951, 1961; Hinsley 1963). In the twentieth century Woodrow Wilson joined the idea that free trade promotes peace with the idea of a universal international orga- nization to promote the same goal. According to Felix Gilbert, "intel- lectually, a straight line leads from the enlightenment to Wilson's concept. His ideas about a 'new diplomacy' were definitely depen- dent on and influenced by the ideas which the eighteenth century had developed on this subject" (Gilbert 1951:37). During the period between the two world wars, international relations began to emerge as an academic field, especially in the United States. William T. R. Fox describes this period as character- ized by the assumption of an underlying harmony of international interests coupled with a belief that improved understanding and international institutions could rid the world of the scourge of war (Fox 1949). He points to the "failing of events in the 1930s to accord with the expectations generated by the academic study of interna- tional relations in the 1920s" (Fox 1949:67). The invasion of Manchu- ria, the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement, and the failure of League of Nations sanctions against Italy disillusioned interna- tional relations scholars and planted the seeds from which modern realism grew. After World War I1 realism emerged as the dominant paradigm among international relations scholars. Although a debate between realism and idealism occurred in the 1945-55 period, among political scientists "authentic self-proclaimed idealists were hard to find" (Fox 1989:239; see also Wolfers 1949; Herz 1950; Morgenthau 1952; Wright 1952; Cook and Moos 1953; and Schilling 1956). Despite the domi- nance of realism, David Mitrany's treatise on functionalism as an approach to peace appeared in the 1940s (Mitrany 1943; Claude 1956), and Ernst Haas's The Uniting of Europe appeared in 1958. Haas's neofunctionalism spawned numerous studies of regional integration in the 1960s.
Neoliberalism, Neorealism, and World Politics^13
During the 1970s and 1980s the debate between neorealism and eral institutionalism began to take more definite shape. Three es- ally important works on the liberal side were the special issue of national Organizafion on "Transnational Relations and World Pol- ' in 1971 (Keohane and Nye 1972); Keohane and Nye's Power and dependence in 1977; and the special issue of lnternational Organiza- on "International Regimes" in 1982 (Krasner 1983a). The first d questions about the state-centric focus of realism and dis- ed such nonstate actors as the Roman Catholic Church, the Ford ndation, and multinational business enterprises. In the second, hane and Nye, in their introduction and conclusion to the pub- d book, explicitly challenged realism with respect to the state-as- r assumption, the relative importance of military security on gn policy agendas, the role of military force in international ics, and the fungibility of power resources among issue areas. third, edited by Stephen D. Krasner, set forth both realist and a1 (labeled Grotian) views on international cooperation and insti-
ee especially important works of neorealists during the 1970s 980s included Kenneth Waltz's "Theory of International Rela- ' in 1975, his Theory of lnternational Politics in 1979, and Joseph 's "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique ewest Liberal Institutionalism" in 1988. The first was a pre- ary version of the second, which has become the touchstone for lists, much as Morgenthau's text (1948) served as a touchstone alists in the 1950s. The third explicitly challenged neoliberal tionalism from a neorealist perspective and is included in this
ough the realist vision has dominated thinking about world much of the time since Thucydides wrote his treatise on the nesian War, alternative visions have always existed. The orary debate between neorealism and neoliberalism is differ- om, yet rooted in, a debate that has been going on for centuries. order to lay the intellectual groundwork for the debate, the next ctions address conceptual and theoretical problems raised by ributors. Two fundamental concepts used by both neoliberals eorealists are anarchy and power. The next two sections are to alert the reader to some of the difficulties associated with cepts.
Neoliberalism, Neorealism, and World Politics^15
question. The problem of explaining thought of as a subtype of the general er. Social science theories developed tional relations may provide helpful in- r example, suggests that the same three ce order in families are also responsible n-state and the international political (Boulding 1963; 1978; 1989). He identifies them as exchange s, threat systems, and image integration. The first empha- ewards, the second punishments, and the third harmonization ceptions and interests. Boulding postulates that all social sys- ly on some combination of these processes to achieve and
mples of each process at the international level. e closely associated with trade, economic inter- er kinds of problems studied by neoliberals. systems relate to deterrence and similar phenomena of partic- terest to neorealists. Image integration processes are the do- dy preference formation, learning, and misper- eory is but one example of the kind of general at might be helpful in illuminating the prob- olitics. It illustrates how a single model oliberal emphasis on economic interdepen- the neorealist emphasis on military deterrence, and the psy- preference formation.
CAPABILITIES AND COOPERATION "Although power is a key concept in realist theory," Waltz efinition remains a matter of controversy" er leading neorealist, Robert Gilpin, de- the "concept of power as one of the most troublesome in the international relations" (1981:13) and suggests that the "num- and variety of definitions should be an embarrassment to political ntists" (1975:24). Although power plays a less crucial role in liberal theory, it has also proved to be a troublesome concept for paring the reader for the essays that be helpful to identify some of the problems
16 David A. Baldwin
of power analysis (or capability analysis). These include the specifi- cation of scope and domain, the zero-sum problem, and the fungibil- ity q ~ e s t i o n. ~
Scope and Domain When neorealists and neoliberals debate the significance of rel- ative gains in international politics, they sometimes neglect to specify precisely what kinds of gains they have in mind. Usually the answer is gains in capabilities. This answer, however, begs yet another ques- tion, namely: "Capabilities to get whom to do what?" The most common conception of power in social science treats power relations as a type of causal relationship in which the power wielder affects the behavior, attitudes, beliefs, or propensity to act of another actor. As Nagel points out, "Anyone who employs a causal concept of power must specify domain and scope" (1975:14). This is easier to see if one restates the phrase "country A has power" as "country A causes." The latter phrase prompts one to ask what effects country A causes with respect to whom. Indeed, the phrase makes little sense without answers to such questions. It should be noted that the requirement that scope and domain be specified or clearly implied says nothing about the level of specificity. Thus the requirement is satisfied by either of the following two statements: "The United States has the power to get Iraq to destroy its nuclear weapons." "The United States has the power to get lots of nations to do lots of things." Although the phrase "lots of things" may be rather vague, it does satisfy the minimum requirements for a mean- ingful statement of a causal power relationship. Waltz rejects the causal notion of power and proposes "the old and simple notion that an agent is powerful to the extent that he affects others more than they affect him" (Waltz 1979:192). Waltz's proposed alternative, however, does not eliminate the need to spec- ify scope and domain. In terms of scope, one is entitled to ask which effects matter. In terms of domain, one is entitled to ask which "others" can be a f f e ~ t e d. ~Some neorealist and neoliberal scholars have sought to avoid the need to specify scope and domain by using the term capabilities (or power resources) in their theories. This merely shifts the analytical focus from actual causes to potential causes. Any statement about a state's capabilities is based on a prediction about
18 David A. Baldwin
power, Morgenthau removes all doubt about the policy-contingency assumptions underlying his analysis: "What gives the factors of ge- ography, natural resources, and industrial capacity their actual im- portance for the power of a nation is military preparedness" (114). Regardless of Morgenthau's denials elsewhere of a military notion of power, his analysis of the elements of national power leaves little doubt as to what he has in mind. Scholars who incorporate the concept of capability in their theories need to come to terms with the works of Harold and Margaret Sprout (1945; 1965; 1971). As realists during the 1930s and 1940s, the Sprouts subscribed to the idea that national power could be reduced to basic elements or foundations. Their Foundations of National Power (1945) foreshadowed Morgenthau's treatment of the elements of national power. During the 1950s and 1960s, however, they came to believe that the capabilities of nation-states could not be estimated outside the context of a set of assumptions about who was trying (or might try) to get whom to do what. As they put it:
Without some set of given undertakings (strategies, policies), actual or postulated, with reference to some frame of operational contingencies, actual or postulated, there can be no estimation of political capabilities.
... Failure to keep discussions of capabilities... within some such
policy-contingency frame of reference is all too common. Such failure tends to reduce statements about the "elements" or "foundations" of a given state's power and influence to various irrelevancies. The data of physical geography, or of demography, or of economic production, or of any other field have no intrinsic political relevance whatever. Such data acquire political relevance and significance only when re- lated to some frame of assumptions as to what is to be undertaken or attempted in what operational contingencies (Sprout and Sprout 1965:215-16).
The Zero-Sum Problem The idea that power is zero-sum, in the sense that more for one actor means less for another, is common in the literature of interna- tional relations. Discussions of relative capability gains are especially prone to employment of this notion. In its extreme form (i.e., insis- tence that more power for one actor always means less for another), it is easy to refute. Logically, a single actual or hypothetical example
Neoliberalisrn, Neorealism, and World Politics^19
auld do the job. I have discussed three examples elsewhere and
ill only briefly mention them here:
- Before Friday comes to live on Robinson Crusoe's island, nei- her has any power. After Friday's arrival, Crusoe may acquire power .th respect to Friday; but this power gain cannot be offset by a loss power by Friday, since Friday had no power to begin with.
- If Crusoe handcuffs himself to Friday, he may increase his ility to affect Friday's movements; but he simultaneously increases day's ability to affect his (Crusoe's) movements. 3. The United States' military involvement in Vietnam increased only American ability to affect Vietnamese policy but also Viet- mese ability to affect American policy. (Baldwin 1971; 1989). hose who espouse the view that power is necessarily zero-sum unlikely to be persuaded by such examples. They seem to be ng a unidimensional conception of power along the following es: If battleships (or whatever) are the measure of power, it is sible for two countries to improve their power position vis-a- e another at the same time. The question, of course, is whether ort of monolithic measure of power is useful. A multidimen- concept of power, which allows for variations in scope, weight, or domain, makes such monolithic measures problematic. Once e and domain are introduced, it is both possible and plausible to ribe an increase in battleships by both actors as an increase in bility of each to destroy (scope) the other (domain). is, of course, true that politics is sometimes a zero-sum game. In ential elections, for example, a win for Republicans is a defeat emocrats. In international politics, however, such situations are Thomas Schelling pointed out long ago that such a situation Id arise in a war of complete extermination, [but] otherwise not in war" (Schelling 1960:4-5). "Winning" in a conflict, he ob- d, means gaining relative to one's own value system, not rela- to one's adversary. Except for the rare situation of pure conflict, Iling's approach enables one to envision conflict situations in ich everyone may be a winner or a loser. It is worth noting that elling's view of winning relative to one's own value system cap- es the essence of Clausewitz's conception of victory in war. The portant thing, according to Clausewitz, is to accomplish one's litical goals, not necessarily to destroy the enemy (Clausewitz
Neoliberalism, Neorealism, and World Politics^21
hen addressing the question of whether to judge political power urces high or low in fungibility, it is useful to ask, "Compared to at?The answer sometimes given is money. ut why use money as a standard of comparison? In the first place, t IS the best example we have of fungible resources actually operat- in social processes. In the second place, there is a large scholarly ature describing and analyzing what money is and how it works. he third place, on the principle that it is useful to start from what know and move to what we understand less well, it may be ful to compare money's role in economic exchange with the role ower resources in political exchange. In the fourth place, it is not r what other standard is available. Although one might use the er end of the liquidity continuum as a standard of comparison ., a situation in which each resource has only one use), most ple would probably find it more useful to compare political power urces with the real-world phenomenon of money than with a thetical case that has never been found in the real world. And
,it has often been suggested that power is like money (Parsons
Baldwin 1971; 1989; Deutsch 1988). It is important to under- both the advantages and disadvantages of such an analogy
scussions of concerns about relative gains as motivators of state vior often assume that states calculate and compare the value of ility gains more or less the way consumers calculate and com- he value of goods in a market. Although states do attempt such lations, they face difficulties that consumers do not. In a mone- market, money serves not only as a medium of exchange but s a standardized measure of economic value. In politics, how- there is no generally recognized measuring rod of political to facilitate comparisons. It is sometimes suggested that money tates theorizing about economic behavior and that the absence olitical counterpart to money impedes theorizing about politics. (1990) has disputed this view, dismissing it as a mere measure- problem. He concedes that political capability "cannot be ex- ed in units, such as dollars, that would have clear meaning and plicable to different instruments and ends" (1990:27-28); but he s the absence of numbers in Adam Smith's theory in support of ntention that the lack of a political counterpart to money has ng to do with theory construction.
22 David A. Baldwin
From the standpoint of theory construction, however, the clarity of key concepts is essential. Although it is true that numbers do not play an important part in Adam Smith's analysis, he devotes consid- erable attention to clarification of the concept of money as both a measure of value and as a medium of exchange. When Adam Smith talks about the combined wealth of a country, it is clear what this means. When Waltz refers to the "combined capabilities" of a coun- try, however, there is no comparably clear meaning. What makes the absence of a political counterpart to money an impediment to theory construction is not so much the difficulty of measurement; rather it is the clarity of the concept of political value. We have a much better idea of what it means to attribute economic value to something than we have of what it means to attribute political value to something
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Anatol Rapoport (1960) once distinguished among "fights" (in which opponents try to harm one another), "games" (in which op- ponents try to outwit one another), and "debates" (in which oppo- nents try to convince each other). The essays in this volume clearly deserve to be classified as debates. Although neither side is likely to convince the other completely, each can learn from the other and thereby advance our understanding of international politics. Relative gains may be important in politics, but in scholarship absolute gains are what matter. The debate between neorealism and neoliberalism continues to evolve. Each of the essays in this volume constitutes an important contribution to this debate. There are, however, several dimensions of the debate that need further elaboration and research. The most important research need is better understanding of the conditions that promote or inhibit international cooperation. The debate between neorealism and neoliberalism has generated at least six hypotheses worthy of more research and testing.1° The first con- cerns the strategy of reciprocity. Both the theoretical and practical conditions under which such strategies promote cooperation deserve attention. The second hypothesis suggests that the number of actors affects the likelihood of cooperation. Although cooperation might seem easier with fewer actors, Milner (1992) has recently suggested that the relationship may be more complicated than that. The third
