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Group Selection and the Evolution of Morality: Wilson's Perspective, Assignments of Moral Psychology

The concept of group selection and its role in the evolution of morality, drawing on examples from anthropology and sociology. Wilson argues that group selection favors solid citizens and cooperative behaviors, while individual selection favors shirkers and selfishness. The text also discusses the importance of understanding altruism and cooperation as behaviors that can exist in degrees, rather than as reified things. Examples of how gossip and morality function in hunter-gatherer societies to reinforce cooperative behaviors and punish selfishness.

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2022/2023

Uploaded on 12/24/2023

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Wilson calls this “the fundamental problem of social life” and provides the following group
selection solution:
Imagine not one but many populations that vary in their
proportions of solid citizens and shirkers. Even if shirkers
fare better than solid citizens within each population,
populations with an excess of solid citizens fare better than
populations with an excess of shirkers. In short, there is
a process of natural selection at the group level that
favors solid citizens, just as there is a process of natural
selection at the individual level (within each group)
favoring shirkers. Group-level adaptations will evolve
whenever group-level selection is stronger than individual-
level selection.
35
Part of the problem in this debate is the all-too-human tendency to dichotomize. Instead of
viewing this as a forced choice between individual selection and group selection, we can
readily adopt a hierarchical theory of evolution, where we recognize and acknowledge
both forces at work. A second challenge is in how we define certain terms, such as altruism
and cooperation, and the temptation to force these categories into either-or choices, where
people are (generally/situationally /purely) altruistic or selfish, cooperative or competitive. As
descriptive terms, altruistic and cooperative are not reified things; they are behaviors.
And like all behaviors, there is a broad range of expression, from a little to a lot. Here
again a fuzzy logic analysis helps clarify this complex human phenomenon. Depending on
the circumsta nces, some people in some situations are .2 altruistic and .8 nonaltruistic (or
selfish), or .6 cooperative and .4 noncooperative (or competitive). Fuzzy fractions apply to
individual and group selection as well. Individuals and groups can be altruistic and
nonaltruistic, cooperative and noncooperative in degrees of expression changing over
varying circumstances. It all depends on the situation. In this context, it might be useful to
settle the group selection debate, at least provisionally, by acknowledging that group
selection might work in a limited set of circumstances for some species. Group selection is not
in opposition to individual selection; it is complementary, giving whole populations a selective
advantage over other whole populations.
In applying group selection to the origins of religion, Wilson argues that “Religions exist
primarily for people to achieve together what they cannot achieve alone. The mechanisms
that enable religious groups to function as adaptive units include the very beliefs and
practices that make religion appear enigmatic to so many people who stand outside of
them.” Going inside religion, Wilson argues, allows us to see what their practical function
is—the group itself becomes a living organism, subject to the forces of natural selection.
“Through countless generations of variation and selection, they acquire properties that
enable them to survive and reproduce in their environments.”36 He notes as support, for
example, anthropological studies of meat sharing practiced by all modern hunter-gatherer
communities around the world. It turns out that these small bands and tribes—which can
cautiously be used as a model for our own Paleolithic ancestors—are remarkably
egalitarian. Using portable scales to precisely measure how much meat each family within
the group received after a successful hunt, anthropologists discovered that the immediate
families of successful hunters got no more meat than the rest of the families i n the group,
even when this was averaged over several weeks of regular hunting excursions. “Hunter-
gatherers are egalitarian, not because they lack selfish impulses but because selfish
impulses are effectively controlled by other members of the group,” Wilson explains. “In
human hunter-gatherer groups, an individual who attempts to dominate others is likely to
encounter the combined resistance of the rest of the group. In most cases even the
strongest individual is no match for the collective, so self-serving acts are effectively
curtailed.”37
How gossip, morality, and group selection link together can be seen in studies of a number of
hunter- gatherer societies. Anthropologist Chris Boehm, for example, has demonstrated the
use of gossip to ridicule, shun, and even ostracize individuals whose competitive drives
and selfish motives interfere with the cooperative needs and altruistic tendencies of the
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Wilson calls this “the fundamental problem of social life” and provides the following group selection solution: Imagine not one but many populations that vary in their proportions of solid citizens and shirkers. Even if shirkers fare better than solid citizens within each population, populations with an excess of solid citizens fare better than populations with an excess of shirkers. In short, there is a process of natural selection at the group level that favors solid citizens, just as there is a process of natural selection at the individual level (within each group) favoring shirkers. Group-level adaptations will evolve whenever group-level selection is stronger than individual- level selection.^35 Part of the problem in this debate is the all-too-human tendency to dichotomize. Instead of viewing this as a forced choice between individual selection and group selection, we can readily adopt a hierarchical theory of evolution, where we recognize and acknowledge both forces at work. A second challenge is in how we define certain terms, such as altruism and cooperation, and the temptation to force these categories into either-or choices, where people are (generally/situationally /purely) altruistic or selfish, cooperative or competitive. As descriptive terms, altruistic and cooperative are not reified things; they are behaviors. And like all behaviors, there is a broad range of expression, from a little to a lot. Here again a fuzzy logic analysis helps clarify this complex human phenomenon. Depending on the circumsta nces, some people in some situations are .2 altruistic and .8 nonaltruistic (or selfish), or .6 cooperative and .4 noncooperative (or competitive). Fuzzy fractions apply to individual and group selection as well. Individuals and groups can be altruistic and nonaltruistic, cooperative and noncooperative in degrees of expression changing over varying circumstances. It all depends on the situation. In this context, it might be useful to settle the group selection debate, at least provisionally, by acknowledging that group selection might work in a limited set of circumstances for some species. Group selection is not in opposition to individual selection; it is complementary, giving whole populations a selective advantage over other whole populations. In applying group selection to the origins of religion, Wilson argues that “Religions exist primarily for people to achieve together what they cannot achieve alone. The mechanisms that enable religious groups to function as adaptive units include the very beliefs and practices that make religion appear enigmatic to so many people who stand outside of them.” Going inside religion, Wilson argues, allows us to see what their practical function is—the group itself becomes a living organism, subject to the forces of natural selection. “Through countless generations of variation and selection, they acquire properties that enable them to survive and reproduce in their environments.”^36 He notes as support, for example, anthropological studies of meat sharing practiced by all modern hunter-gatherer communities around the world. It turns out that these small bands and tribes—which can cautiously be used as a model for our own Paleolithic ancestors—are remarkably egalitarian. Using portable scales to precisely measure how much meat each family within the group received after a successful hunt, anthropologists discovered that the immediate families of successful hunters got no more meat than the rest of the families in the group, even when this was averaged over several weeks of regular hunting excursions. “Hunter- gatherers are egalitarian, not because they lack selfish impulses but because selfish impulses are effectively controlled by other members of the group,” Wilson explains. “In human hunter-gatherer groups, an individual who attempts to dominate others is likely to encounter the combined resistance of the rest of the group. In most cases even the strongest individual is no match for the collective, so self-serving acts are effectively curtailed.”^37 How gossip, morality, and group selection link together can be seen in studies of a number of hunter- gatherer societies. Anthropologist Chris Boehm, for example, has demonstrated the use of gossip to ridicule, shun, and even ostracize individuals whose competitive drives and selfish motives interfere with the cooperative needs and altruistic tendencies of the

group. In other words, people are competitive and selfish, and individual selection has created these important and powerful drives. But people are also cooperative and altruistic, and these drives are created and reinforced by the group in which the individual lives. Thus, an emotional sense of “right” and “wrong” action is ingrained into individuals back to the earliest days in human evolutionary history, through genetic transmission of such traits

emotions of righteousness and pride, guilt and shame, is a human universal that had an evolutionary origin. There is variation within human populations on this evolved trait, just as there is variation in any personality trait, where some people feel more or less guilt or more or less pride than others. This variation, like the variation in personality traits, is accounted for by roughly half genetics and half environment. Consider tipping at a restaurant in a city where you have never been and will never return. Since I travel a fair amount for my work I am faced with this moral question nearly every trip: why should I bother to

tip a restaurant server I will never see again? There is no anticipated reciprocity since the tip comes after the service. I often dine alone so there is no one to impress with my generosity. Since I do not believe in God my answer cannot be “because God will know.” (Even if you are a believer this seems like a rather shallow reason in any case.) Ethical egoism theory states that I will leave a tip because it makes me feel good. That is, tipping is not an altruistic act at all, but a purely selfish one. But what does it mean to feel good about an act, regardless of whether we consider it selfish or altruistic? In my theory this sense of feeling good about doing something good for someone else is an evolved moral sense that has a perfectly reasonable evolutionary explanation. Humans practice both deception and self-deception. Research shows that we are better at deception than at deception detection, but deceivers get caught often enough that it is risky to attempt to deceive others. Research also shows that the normal cues we give off when we are attempting to deceive others (particularly nonverbal cues like taking a deep breath, looking away from the person you are talking to, hesitating before answering, and so forth) are less likely to be expressed if you actually believe the deception yourself.^39 Liars are not liars if they believe the lie. This is the power of self-deception. It is not enough to fake doing the right thing in order to fool our fellow group members, because although we are fairly good deceivers, we are also fairly good deception detectors. We cannot fool all of the people all of the time, and we do learn to assess (through gossip, in part) who is trustworthy and who is not trustworthy, so it is better to actually be a moral person because that way you actually believe it yourself and thus there is no need for deception. What I am saying is that the best way to convince others that you are a moral person is not to fake being a moral person but to actually be a moral person. Don’t just go through the motions of being moral (although this is a good start), actually be moral. Don’t just pretend to do the right thing, do the right thing. It is my contention that this is how moral sentiments evolved in our Paleolithic ancestors living in small communities. Modern game theory grants us a deeper understanding of the tension between competitiveness and cooperation, the most common example of which is the “Prisoner’s Dilemma,” first developed in the 1950s by the Rand Corporation to model global nuclear strategy. The scenario is that each of two prisoners arrested for a crime is independently made an offer (and both know the other has been presented with the same deal). To make the game more real, pretend you are one of those charged with the crime. Here are the four possible options:

1. If you and your partner cooperate with each other and take the Fifth, then you each get one year in jail. 2. If you confess and admit that your partner was in on the crime with you, then you get off and your partner gets three years in the slammer. 3. If your partner confesses and you don’t, then you receive a three-year stay in the pokey while he walks. 4. If you both confess, then you each get a two-year stay in the gray-bar hotel. What should you do? If you defect on your partner and confess, then you will get either zero or two years in the pen, depending on what he does. If you cooperate and stay quiet, you get either one or three years, again depending on his response. In this scenario the logical choice is to defect. Of course, your partner is likely going to make the same calculation as you, which means he too will defect, guaranteeing that you will receive a two-year stint in prison. Knowing that he is probably computing the same strategy as you, then surely he will realize that you should both cooperate. Of course, perhaps he’ll figure that this will be your conclusion as well, so he’ll defect in hopes that you will cooperate, getting him off the hook and sending you to wallow in the general population for three big ones. Herein lies the dilemma. When the game is noniterated—that is, just one round is played—defection is the norm. When the game is iterated over a fixed number of trials, defection is also the norm because awareness of how many rounds there will be means that both players know that the other one will defect on the last round, which pushes another defection strategy to the second to the last round, and so forth back to the start of the game. But when the game is iterated over an unknown number of trials, and both players keep track of what the other has been doing throughout the history of the game—that is, it more closely resembles real life— cooperation prevails.