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Theory of Action & Agency: Intentional Actions & Rationality, Essays (university) of Economics

The standard theory of action and agency, focusing on intentional actions, practical rationality, and categorical reasons. The causal account of intentional actions and reason explanation, the standard theory of action (close connection and identity), agency, practical rationality, and theorizing about practical rationality. Two types of practical reasons, normative and explanatory, and two poles in theorizing about practical rationality, hypothetical-only and categorical-also, are also covered. Neo-humeanism, aristotelianism, and kantianism as influential theories are mentioned.

Typology: Essays (university)

2017/2018

Uploaded on 02/20/2018

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Practical Reasoning and Agency
13 September 2017
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Practical Reasoning and Agency

13 September 2017

Outline of the Course

Some of the More Plausible Essential Features of Personhood

  1. Rationality (theoretical and practical)
  2. Mind, consciousness, and intentionality
  3. The intentional stance and reciprocation
  4. Language and communication
  5. Higher-order consciousness

Practical Rationality

Practical Rationality

The study of what we ought to do/the study of what a rational agent would do.

  • theories of practical rationality
  • theories of agency
  • ethical theories
  • moral psychology

Agency

Action

The Standard Theory of Action

  1. The standard conception of action, and
  2. the causal account of intentional action and reason explanation. (Schlosser 2015: §2)

Two Ways of Spelling Out Claim 1

  1. The notion of intentional action is more fundamental than the notion of action.

a. One and the same event can be more than one action under different descriptions, and it is an action just in case it is an intentional action under some description. b. Something is an action if either it is identical to or generated by an intentional action. (Schlosser 2015: §2)

Two Ways of Spelling Out Claim 1

Action? Intentional?

  • turning on the light
  • alerting the burglar
  • twisting your ankle
  • startling a nearby animal

Two Ways of Spelling Out Claim 2

  1. There is a close connection between intentional action and acting for a reason.

a. Acting intentionally is the same thing as acting for a reason.

Acting for a Reason

To act for a reason is to act in a way that can be rationalized by the premises of a sound practical syllogism, which typically consists of a major premise that corresponds to the agent’s goal (desire) and a minor premise that corresponds to the agent’s take on how to attain the goal (belief). (Schlosser 2015: §2)

Acting for a Reason

Acting for a Reason

To act for a reason is to act in a way that can be rationalized by the premises of a sound practical syllogism, which typically consists of a major premise that corresponds to the agent’s goal (desire) and a minor premise that corresponds to the agent’s take on how to attain the goal (belief). (Schlosser 2015: §2)

The Principle of Instrumental Reason

If x desires to ψ and believes that, in order to ψ, x must ϕ, then x ought to ϕ.

Two Ways of Spelling Out Claim 2

  1. There is a close connection between intentional action and acting for a reason.

a. Acting intentionally is the same thing as acting for a reason. b. Intentions cannot be reduced to desires and beliefs (or combinations thereof). Intentions play a crucial and irreducible role in practical reasoning, long-term planning, and in the initiation and guidance of action. (Schlosser 2015: §2)

Why might someone want to adopt (b) rather than (a)?

Two Ways of Spelling Out Claim 2

  1. There is a close connection between intentional action and acting for a reason.

a. Acting intentionally is the same thing as acting for a reason. b. Intentions cannot be reduced to desires and beliefs (or combinations thereof). Intentions play a crucial and irreducible role in practical reasoning, long-term planning, and in the initiation and guidance of action. (Schlosser 2015: §2)

Why might someone want to adopt (b) rather than (a)?

The Standard Conception of Action

  1. The notion of intentional action is more fundamental than the notion of action, and
  2. there is a close connection between intentional action and acting for a reason. (Schlosser 2015: §2)

The Standard Theory of Action

  1. The standard conception of action, and
  2. the causal account of intentional action and reason explanation. (Schlosser 2015: §2)