The Supreme Court's Role in Impeachment Proceedings: A Case Study on the One-Year Ban | Summaries Law

G.R. No. 193459 February 15, 2011

GUTIERREZ vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE

Facts:

1. On 22 July 2010, Baraquel, et al. filed an

impeachment complaint (First Complaint) against

Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez

(petitioner) based on betrayal of public trust and

culpable violation of the Constitution.

2. On 3 August 2010, a Second Complaint was filed by

Reyes, et al. against the same respondent also

based on betrayal of public trust and culpable

violation of the Constitution.

3. On 11 August 2010, the two complaints were

referred by the House Plenary to the Committee on

Justice at the same time.

4. On 1 September 2010, the Committee on Justice

found the First and Second Complaints sufficient in

form. On 7 September 2010, the Committee on

Justice, found the First and Second Complaints were

sufficient in form.

5. On 13 September 2010, petitioner filed a petition for

certiorari and prohibition before the Supreme Court

seeking to enjoin the Committee on Justice from

proceeding with the impeachment proceedings. The

petition prayed for a temporary restraining order.

Petitioner: She invokes the Court’s expanded certiorari

jurisdiction to "determine whether or not there has

been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack

or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or

instrumentality of the Government."

Public Respondent: The petition is premature and not

yet ripe for adjudication since petitioner has at her

disposal a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the

course of the proceedings before public respondent.

Public respondent argues that when petitioner filed

the present petition on September 13, 2010, it had

not gone beyond the determination of the sufficiency

of form and substance of the two complaints. Hence,

certiorari is unavailing.

6. The following day, during the en banc morning

session of 14 September 2010, the majority of the

Court voted to issue a status quo ante order

suspending the impeachment proceedings against

petitioner. (Note: In urgent cases, it is a matter of

practice for the Court that all the Justices should

have been given time, at least an hour or two, to

read the petition before voting on the issuance of

the status quo ante order. Unfortunately, this was not

done.)

7. Section 3(5), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution

provides that "no impeachment proceedings shall be

initiated against the same official more than once

within a period of one year."

Issue #1: Does the Supreme Court have the power to

determine whether public respondent committed a

violation of the Constitution in the exercise of its

discretion relating to impeachment proceeding?

Held: YES, under the doctrine of expanded judicial

review. The Constitution did not intend to leave the

matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of

Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined

limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr,"judicially

discoverable standards" for determining the validity of

the exercise of such discretion, through the power of

judicial review.

There exists no constitutional basis for the contention

that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment

proceedings would upset the system of checks and

balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a

whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat

another." Both are integral components of the calibrated

system of independence and interdependence that

insures that no branch of government act beyond the

powers assigned to it by the Constitution.

Indubitably, the Court is not asserting its ascendancy

over the Legislature in this instance, but simply

upholding the supremacy of the Constitution as the

repository of the sovereign will.

Issue #2: Is the petition premature and not yet ripe for

adjudication?

Held: NO. In the present petition, there is no doubt that

questions on the validity of the simultaneous referral of

the two complaints and on the need to publish as a

mode of promulgating the Rules of Procedure in

Impeachment Proceedings of the House (Impeachment

Rules) present constitutional vagaries which call for

immediate interpretation.

The unusual act of simultaneously referring to public

respondent two impeachment complaints presents a

novel situation to invoke judicial power. Petitioner cannot

thus be considered to have acted prematurely when she

took the cue from the constitutional limitation that only

one impeachment proceeding should be initiated against

an impeachable officer within a period of one year.

Issue #3: When is an impeachment complaint deemed

initiated?

Held: There are two components of the act of initiating

the complaint: the filing of the impeachment complaint

AND the referral by the House Plenary to the Committee

on Justice. Once an impeachment complaint has been

initiated (meaning, filed and initiated), another

impeachment complaint may not be filed against the

same official within a one year period.

Issue #4: Do the Impeachment Rules provide for

comprehensible standards in determining the sufficiency

of form and substance?

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G.R. No. 193459 February 15, 2011 GUTIERREZ vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE Facts:

On 22 July 2010, Baraquel, et al. filed an impeachment complaint (First Complaint) against Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez (petitioner) based on betrayal of public trust and culpable violation of the Constitution.
On 3 August 2010, a Second Complaint was filed by Reyes, et al. against the same respondent also based on betrayal of public trust and culpable violation of the Constitution.
On 11 August 2010, the two complaints were referred by the House Plenary to the Committee on Justice at the same time.
On 1 September 2010, the Committee on Justice found the First and Second Complaints sufficient in form. On 7 September 2010, the Committee on Justice, found the First and Second Complaints were sufficient in form.
On 13 September 2010, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Supreme Court seeking to enjoin the Committee on Justice from proceeding with the impeachment proceedings. The petition prayed for a temporary restraining order. Petitioner: She invokes the Court’s expanded certiorari jurisdiction to "determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." Public Respondent: The petition is premature and not yet ripe for adjudication since petitioner has at her disposal a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of the proceedings before public respondent. Public respondent argues that when petitioner filed the present petition on September 13, 2010, it had not gone beyond the determination of the sufficiency of form and substance of the two complaints. Hence, certiorari is unavailing.
The following day, during the en banc morning session of 14 September 2010, the majority of the Court voted to issue a status quo ante order suspending the impeachment proceedings against petitioner. (Note: In urgent cases, it is a matter of practice for the Court that all the Justices should have been given time, at least an hour or two, to read the petition before voting on the issuance of the status quo ante order. Unfortunately, this was not done.)
Section 3(5), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that "no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year ." Issue #1: Does the Supreme Court have the power to determine whether public respondent committed a violation of the Constitution in the exercise of its discretion relating to impeachment proceeding? Held: YES, under the doctrine of expanded judicial review. The Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr ,"judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review. There exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution. Indubitably, the Court is not asserting its ascendancy over the Legislature in this instance, but simply upholding the supremacy of the Constitution as the repository of the sovereign will. Issue #2: Is the petition premature and not yet ripe for adjudication? Held: NO. In the present petition, there is no doubt that questions on the validity of the simultaneous referral of the two complaints and on the need to publish as a mode of promulgating the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the House (Impeachment Rules) present constitutional vagaries which call for immediate interpretation. The unusual act of simultaneously referring to public respondent two impeachment complaints presents a novel situation to invoke judicial power. Petitioner cannot thus be considered to have acted prematurely when she took the cue from the constitutional limitation that only one impeachment proceeding should be initiated against an impeachable officer within a period of one year. Issue #3: When is an impeachment complaint deemed initiated? Held: There are two components of the act of initiating the complaint: the filing of the impeachment complaint AND the referral by the House Plenary to the Committee on Justice. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated (meaning, filed and initiated), another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period. Issue #4: Do the Impeachment Rules provide for comprehensible standards in determining the sufficiency of form and substance?

Held: YES. Contrary to petitioner’ contention, the Impeachment Rules are clear in echoing the constitutional requirements and providing that there must be a "verified complaint or resolution," and that the substance requirement is met if there is "a recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the committee. In fact, it is only in the Impeachment Rules where a determination of sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment complaint is made necessary. This requirement is not explicitly found in the Constitution which merely requires a "hearing." ( Section 3[2], Article XI). In the discharge of its constitutional duty, the House deemed that a finding of sufficiency of form and substance in an impeachment complaint is vital "to effectively carry out" the impeachment process, hence, such additional requirement in the Impeachment Rules. Issue #5: May the Supreme Court look into the narration of facts constitutive of the offenses vis-à-vis petitioner’s submissions disclaiming the allegations in the complaints? Held: NO. This issue would "require the Court to make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislature (Francisco vs. House of Representatives.) Issue #6: Was petitioner denied of due process, because of the delay in the publication of the Impeachment Rules? Held: NO. The Supreme Court discussed the difference between publication and promulgation. To recall, days after the 15th Congress opened on July 26, 2010 or on August 3, 2010, public respondent provisionally adopted the Impeachment Rules of the 14th Congress and thereafter published on September 2, 2010 its Impeachment Rules, admittedly substantially identical with that of the 14th Congress, in two newspapers of general circulation. Citing Tañada v. Tuvera, petitioner contends that she was deprived of due process since the Impeachment Rules was published only on September 2, 2010 a day after public respondent ruled on the sufficiency of form of the complaints. She likewise tacks her contention on Section 3(8), Article XI of the Constitution which directs that "Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section." Public respondent counters that "promulgation" in this case refers to "the publication of rules in any medium of information, not necessarily in the Official Gazette or newspaper of general circulation." While "promulgation" would seem synonymous to "publication," there is a statutory difference in their usage. The Constitution notably uses the word "promulgate" 12 times. A number of those instances involves the promulgation of various rules, reports and issuances emanating from Congress, the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman as well as other constitutional offices. To appreciate the statutory difference in the usage of the terms "promulgate" and "publish," the case of the Judiciary is in point. In promulgating rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the Supreme Court has invariably required the publication of these rules for their effectivity. As far as promulgation of judgments is concerned, however, PROMULGATION means "the delivery of the decision to the clerk of court for filing and publication. Promulgation must thus be used in the context in which it is generally understood—that is, to make known. Since the Constitutional Commission did not restrict "promulgation" to "publication," the former should be understood to have been used in its general sense. It is within the discretion of Congress to determine on how to promulgate its Impeachment Rules, in much the same way that the Judiciary is permitted to determine that to promulgate a decision means to deliver the decision to the clerk of court for filing and publication. It is not for the Supreme Court to tell a co-equal branch of government how to promulgate when the Constitution itself has not prescribed a specific method of promulgation. The Court is in no position to dictate a mode of promulgation beyond the dictates of the Constitution. Inquiries in aid of legislation under Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution is the sole instance in the Constitution where there is a categorical directive to duly publish a set of rules of procedure. (Neri vs. Senate) Even assuming arguendo that publication is required, lack of it does not nullify the proceedings taken prior to the effectivity of the Impeachment Rules which faithfully comply with the relevant self-executing provisions of the Constitution. Otherwise, in cases where impeachment complaints are filed at the start of each Congress, the mandated periods under Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution would already run or even lapse while awaiting the expiration of the 15-day period of publication prior to the effectivity of the Impeachment Rules. In effect, the House would already violate the Constitution for its inaction on the impeachment complaints pending the completion of the publication requirement. (Just like what happened in this case, where the complaint was filed even before the 15 th^ Congress open its first session) Given that the Constitution itself states that any promulgation of the rules on impeachment is aimed at "effectively carry[ing] out the purpose" of impeachment proceedings, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion when the House deemed it proper to provisionally adopt the Rules on Impeachment of the

maintains that the Constitution allows only one impeachment complaint against her within one year. Records show that public respondent disavowed any immediate need to consolidate. Its chairperson Rep. Tupas stated that "[c]onsolidation depends on the Committee whether to consolidate[; c]onsolidation may come today or may come later on after determination of the sufficiency in form and substance," and that "for purposes of consolidation, the Committee will decide when is the time to consolidate[, a]nd if, indeed, we need to consolidate."^95 Petitioner’s petition, in fact, initially describes the consolidation as merely "contemplated."^96 Since public respondent, whether motu proprio or upon motion, did not yet order a consolidation, the Court will not venture to make a determination on this matter, as it would be premature, conjectural or anticipatory.^97 Even if the Court assumes petitioner’s change of stance that the two impeachment complaints were deemed consolidated,^98 her claim that consolidation is a legal anomaly fails. Petitioner’s theory obviously springs from her "proceeding = complaint" equation which the Court already brushed aside.

The Supreme Court's Role in Impeachment Proceedings: A Case Study on the One-Year Ban, Summaries of Law

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